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Abstract
A popular form of action to curb child labor and uphold international
labor standards in general is a product boycott by consumers. There are
labeling agencies that inform us if, for instance, a carpet or a hand-stitched
soccer ball is free of child labor. The presence of a consumer boycott
will typically mean that products tainted by child labor will command
a lower price on the market than ones certiﬁed to be untainted. It is
popularly presumed that such consumer activism is desirable. The paper
formally investigates this presumption and shows that consumer product
boycotts can, in a wide class of situations, have a backlash that causes
child labor to rise rather than fall. This happens under weak and plausible
assumptions. Hence, there has to be much greater caution in the use of
consumer activism and one has to have much more detailed information
about the context, where child labor occurs, before using a boycott.
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11 Motivation
The use of product boycotts by consumers is one of the more enduring actions
that have been contemplated and used to control child labor and the violation of
other minimal labor standards in developing countries. From college campuses
to street gatherings during international conferences, such as the WTO minis-
terial meetings, there has been a growing campaign to encourage consumers to
boycott goods that may have used child labor as input or violated other labor
standards in the course of their production. These actions have become par-
ticularly popular because they do not involve the heavy hand of government
intervention or lengthy legal action. It seems as if ordinary consumers, going
about their regular chores and shopping, can inﬂuence the world in certain de-
sirable ways. While in the popular mind this is virtually an axiom, there is
very little by way of serious analytical examination of this ‘axiom.’ The aim of
this paper is to do precisely that.
We undertake a theoretical investigation into this problem and come up with
some surprisingly clear answers. That boycotting products that use child labor
can harm the well-being of children is not too surprising to economists. In
a lucid essay, Edmonds (2003) points out how children can get hurt by these
sanctions if they live in regions where the alternative to work is dismal and
when these sanctions are not complemented with the provision of alternative
opportunities for the children. This is a natural conclusion if it is the case
that children work because of their poverty and the lack of alternatives, such
as decent schooling (Basu and Van, 1998; Swinnerton and Rogers, 1999; Dessy
and Pallage, 2005). Our formal analysis conﬁrms this, but it goes further.
It shows that, quite paradoxically, the boycott of child labor-tainted products
can actually cause child labor to increase. We refer to this as the ‘backlash
proposition.’
The broad intuition behind the backlash result is as follows. First, we
should clarify that by boycott we do not mean an avoidance of certain products
under all circumstances, but more realistically that consumers are willing to
pay a price to avoid using products tainted by child labor. Now, suppose child
labor is largely caused by the pursuit of poor families trying to escape extreme
poverty, for which there is now considerable evidence (see Kambhampati and
Rajan, 2004; Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2005, for a survey). If consumers decide to
boycott products that are produced by child labor, then ﬁrms will realize that
the use of child labor will mean that their products will sell for a lower price.
Hence, the existence of such a boycott on the part of consumers will make child
labor a less attractive input than it would have been otherwise. This will cause
child wage to drop. In case children were working so as to avert extreme poverty
for themselves and their families, as assumed above, then the lower wage will
mean that they will have to work harder.
Of course, the above summary simpliﬁes the argument. It turns out, for
instance, that there are circumstances where boycotts can cause child labor to
decrease. The advantage of the theoretical exercise is that it provides us with
a model for asking a host of related questions. Under what conditions will the
2problem of child labor get exacerbated by boycotts? And when will child labor
go down? What will be the impact of a boycott on the welfare of children?
The theoretical model also helps us decide what the focus of future empirical
studies ought to be in order for us to get more context-speciﬁca n s w e r st os o m e
of these questions.
The scope for consumer action in upholding labor standards has increased
considerably over the last decade, as the idea of product labeling has caught on
in a big way. In India, for instance, carpets are labeled by Rugmark (a private
initiative) and Kaleen (a quasi-governmental body) so that a consumer buying
a hand-knotted carpet will know if it is child labor-free. In Switzerland, there
is the labeling organization STEP which gives companies a clean chit if they are
found to practice fair labor standards and not use child labor. The same is true
of Brazil’s Abrinq Foundation that labels toy companies that abjure child labor
as "child friendly." In Pakistan, the soccer ball industry makes considerable
use of product labeling for its exports to the United States. By all accounts
these eﬀorts are of great signiﬁcance (U.S. Department of Labor, 1997; Sharma,
Sharma and Raj, 2000), and it is therefore important to bring economics to
understand the impact of these kinds of interventions.
This is one area where, we already know from past research, pathological
reactions to diﬀerent kinds of policy interventions abound (Basu, 2000, 2005;
Ranjan, 2001, Jafarey and Lahiri, 2002; Rogers and Swinnerton, 2004). This
can explain why child labor has been such a stubborn problem in history, that
has resisted government policy over large stretches of time (Moehling, 1999;
Humphries, 1999). It is of course possible to argue that the policies that have
been pursued are themselves endogenous (see Doepke and Zilibotti, 2005). But
it is possible that some policy choices were caused by misinformation about the
impact of those choices. The present paper is meant to be a small contribution
to shed further light on the impact of a widely used intervention.
The basic model is developed in Section 2, the main result and its policy
implications are spelled out in Section 3, and Section 4 discusses the scope for
empirical work.
2 Model: Preliminaries
The exogenous variable, the eﬀect of which on various parameters is the focus of
our study, is the boycott of products by consumers. Thus it is useful to begin
by setting out clearly what we mean by this. Since our main concern is child
l a b o r ,l e tu sa s s u m et h a tw h a tc o n s u m e r sm a yo rm a yn o tw i s ht ob o y c o t ti sa
product that has been produced using child labor. For example, consider the
product of interest to be hand-knotted carpets or rugs. Very simply, we will
assume that if p is the price of carpets that are free of child labor, then, given a
consumer boycott of child labor, the price of carpets that have been produced
using any positive amount of child labor will be αp,w h e r eα<1. An increased
boycott of child labor is thus equated with a drop in α.
This simple characterization of boycotts can be derived from basic consumer
3theory. Suppose a consumer buys x units of rugs. Of this, let us suppose x1
rugs are child-labor free and x2 are tainted. Hence x = x1 +x2. A consumer’s
utility comes from the number of rugs she consumes and money, g, spent on all
other goods. She also has to pay a mental ‘guilt cost’ which is proportional
to the amount of money, T, she spends on the tainted product. One simple
quasi-linear utility function capturing this is as follows:
u = θ(x)+g − ηT (1)
where η>0 and θ
0 > 0, θ
00 < 0. Let us suppose that all consumers are identical
and described by (1). If a consumer’s total income is y, the price of untainted
rugs is p1, and the price of tainted rugs is p2, then (1) may be written as:
u = θ(x1 + x2)+( y − p1x1 − p2x2) − ηp2x2
= θ(x1 + x2)+y − p1x1 − p2(1 + η)x2
Note that if p1 >p 2(1 + η), the consumer will buy only tainted rugs, no
matter what her income. Likewise, if p1 <p 2(1+η), she will buy only untainted
rugs, again, irrespective of income. Therefore if both kinds of rugs are to sell






By using α =
1
1+η
,w ei m m e d i a t e l yh a v et h a tα<1,s i n c eη>0. Hence,
we have what we wanted; if the price of the untainted product is p, the price of
the tainted product will be αp.
In the formal exercise, we shall treat α ∈ [0,1]. If α =1 , it means consumers
do not care if products are tainted; that is, there is no product boycott. So
to see the eﬀect of a product boycott, we will compare the cases of α =1and
α<1. To understand the consequence of increasing product boycott, we will
study the eﬀect of α being lowered further.
Let us now turn to the labor market. Suppose each worker household
consists of one adult and m children, and each child has the productive capacity
of a fraction γ of one adult.
We assume that adults supply labor inelastically, and, as suggested above,
that children supply labor in order for the household to reach a minimal accept-
able level of consumption, s. In other words, child labor is caused by the urge
to avoid extreme poverty. This in turn implies that child labor is only supplied
if the adult wage, wA,i sl e s st h a ns. Children face wages wC, and it will turn
out to be that wC <w A. We shall also make the reasonable assumption that
if wC ≤ 0, then the child labor supply is zero.
Firms take labor as the only input; the resultant production function for a
ﬁrm hiring A adults and C children is given by F(A + γC).I n o t h e r w o r d s ,
each ﬁrm has a production function, X = F(L),w h e r eX is the total output
produced by the ﬁrm, and L is the amount of labor, measured in adult labor
4units, used by the ﬁrm. It will be assumed throughout that the production
function satisﬁes the following properties: F(0) = 0;t h e r ee x i s t sb L>0, such
that, for all L<b L, F0(L) > 0 and F00(L) ≤ 0; and, for all L ≥ b L, F(L)=F(b L).
Hence we make the reasonable assumption that output is bounded from above,
and the convenient assumption that the bound can be reached.
Suppose now that a consumer boycott is introduced, such that a ﬁrm hiring
any children will experience reduced demand for its product, as explained above.
Therefore, while a ﬁrm that hires no children faces price p for its output, a ﬁrm
hiring any children faces a price αp,w h e r eα ∈ [0,1]. From here on, we will
normalize prices such that p =1 .




F(A) − wAA if C =0
αF(A + γC) − wAA − wCC if C>0
We can now establish a useful ‘separation result.’ Given the above as-
sumptions, whenever α<1, there will be separation between ﬁrms that employ
adults and ﬁrms that employ children. The intuition is straightforward. Once
a ﬁrm employs children, its product is tainted, and the price is lower; and so
it may as well go all the way. Of course, in reality, the production function is
typically more complex, and children and adults are not entirely substitutable.
Therefore, in reality, we do ﬁnd some adult labor in ﬁrms that employ children.
For one, in a more complex model we would make the realistic assumption of
at least some supervisory adult labor being needed in every ﬁrm. But the
simplicity here is harmless. The lemma that follows establishes the separation
result.
Lemma 1 Let A and C denote the number of adults and children, respectively,
hired by a ﬁrm. Given α<1,t h e r ew i l le x i s tn oﬁrm such that C>0 and
A>0.
Proof. Suppose a ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts by hiring A∗ > 0 adults and C∗ > 0
children. Then its proﬁts are given by
Π(A∗,C∗)=αF(A∗ + γC∗) − wAA∗ − wCC∗
It will be shown that these proﬁts are never higher than both the proﬁts from
hiring only children and the proﬁts from hiring only adults. Let b A = A∗ +γC∗




Π( b A,0) = F( b A) − wA b A,a n d
Π(0, b C)=αF(γ b C) − wC b C
Assume:
Π(A∗,C∗) ≥ Π(0, b C),a n d ( 2 )
5Π(A∗,C∗) ≥ Π( b A,0) (3)
(2) implies:
αF(A∗ + γC∗) − wAA∗ − wCC∗ ≥ αF(γ b C) − wC b C





wC ≥ γwA (4)
(3) implies :
αF(A∗ + γC∗) − wAA∗ − wCC∗ ≥ F( b A) − wA b A
= F(A∗ + γC∗) − wAA∗ − γwAC∗
This implies:
(γwA − wC)C∗ ≥ (1 − α)F(A∗ + γC∗) (5)
From (4), we know the left-hand side of (5) is negative. The right-hand side of
(5) must be positive since α<1. Thus (5) cannot hold, and we get that either
(2) or (3) can hold, but never both. In other words, when faced with consumer
boycotts for hiring children, a ﬁrm will never strictly mix between adults and
children.
The full deﬁnition of an equilibrium in the labor market will be given later.
But note here that an ingredient of the equilibrium is that ﬁrms must be max-
imizing their proﬁts, and the ﬁrms employ a positive amount of adult labor.
Since adult labor supply is positive, we can never have an equilibrium if adult
labor demand is zero. This is all that we need, for now, for the next result.
The next lemma claims that, given a product boycott is on, in equilibrium,
child wage is less than or equal to what we get through a mere adult equivalence
correction of the adult wage. This turns out to be a useful result for the analysis
that follows. It may be stated in full, as follows.
Lemma 2 Assume α<1. Then, in equilibrium, if F00(L)=0 ,f o ra l lL,t h e n
wC = αγwA;a n di fF00(L) < 0,t h e nwC <α γ w A.
Proof. B yL e m m a1w ek n o wt h a te a c hﬁrm will employ either all adults or
all children. Let A∗ be the equilibrium number of adults hired by ﬁrms only
hiring adults, and deﬁne C∗ analogously for all-children ﬁrms. Hence A∗ > 0.
It is important to note that the proﬁts from these two types of ﬁrms must be
equal; if not, then a ﬁrm earning a lower proﬁt could do better by hiring the
kind of labor hired by ﬁrms earning higher proﬁts. So we have:
Π(A∗,0) = F(A∗) − wAA∗ = αF(γC∗) − wCC∗ = Π(0,C∗)
First, consider the case F00 =0 . Then F0(A) is a constant, for all
A.I f F0(A∗) >w A, then demand for adult labor will be inﬁnite and so will
6exceed supply of adult labor. If F0(A∗) <w A, demand for adult labor is zero
and so less than the supply of adult labor. Hence, in equilibrium, wA must be
such that:
F0(A∗)=wA (6)





F00 =0implies that the right-hand sides of (6) and (7) are equal, which means
wC = αγwA.
Now consider the case where F00 < 0.A s s u m e wC ≥ αγwA.C l e a r l y ,
Π(0,C∗)=αF(γC∗) − wCC∗
≤ αF(γC∗) − αγwAC∗
= α[F(γC∗) − wA(γC∗)]
= αΠ(γC∗,0)
≤ αΠ(A∗,0), by the deﬁnition of A∗
< Π(A∗,0),s i n c eα<1 and, by F00 < 0 and A∗ > 0, Π(A∗,0) > 0.
In other words, Π(A∗,0) 6= Π(0,C∗), a contradiction; therefore, it must be that
wC <α γ w A.
3 Model: Equilibrium and the Backlash Propo-
sition
To fully describe the labor market equilibrium, it is useful to write down the
aggregate labor supply and demand functions. Let us suppose that there are
N worker households. From what was stated above in words, each household’s












,o t h e r w i s e (8)
The household’s labor supply, measured in adult labor units, is denoted by
l.I f wA ≥ s, children do not work because adult work can guarantee that the
household reaches the threshold tolerable income, s. Also, if wC ≤ 0, children
do not work, as it would be pointless. Hence, the household labor supply is equal
to the amount of adult labor in each household, namely one unit. In all other
cases, that is when wA <sand wC > 0, children work. They work just enough
to help the houshold reach an income level of s. By this logic, the household
should supply x units of child labor, where wCx = s − wA. But the maximum







Converting this into adult labor units requires us to multiply this by γ.T h i s
explains equation (3.1).
Hence the aggregate labor supply, S,i sg i v e nb y
S = Nl(wA,w C)
Let us next suppose, as described above, that there are M identical ﬁrms
in the economy. We know from Lemma 1 that each ﬁrm will be either an
adult-labor-only ﬁrm or a child-labor-only ﬁrm. It is easy to see that a ﬁrm




[F(A) − wAA]=m a x
C
[αF(γC) − wCC] (9)
Note that (9) implicitly deﬁnes a function:
wc = φ(wA,α) (10)
That is, given α and wA, ﬁrms will be indiﬀerent between being adults-only or
children-only if and only if wC = φ(wA,α).
Assuming (10) holds, let us work out a ﬁrm’s demand for labor. Consider
a ﬁrm that chooses to be adults-only. Its demand for labor is implicitly given
by:
F0(A)=wA (11)
which is the ﬁrst-order condition, derived from the ﬁrm’s maximization problem.
The value of A that solves (11) can be written as a(wA).T h a t i s , F0(a(wA)) =
wA.




Let the total amount of labor–i.e. γ multiplied by the number of children–




An interesting feature of this model is now apparent. A children-only ﬁrm
employs at least as much labor, measured in adult units, than an adults-only
ﬁrm. That is:
c(wC,α) ≥ a(wA) (12)
when ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between employing children-only and adults-only.
To prove this, observe:







≤ wA, with equality only if F00 =0 . Hence, if
F00 =0 , a children-only ﬁr ma n da na d u l t s - o n l yﬁrm employ equal amounts of
labor, measured in adult units. If F00 < 0, F0(a(wA)) >F 0(c(wC,α)),a n da
children-only ﬁrm employs more labor than an adults-only ﬁrm. Hence (12)
must be true.
Therefore, given that (10) always holds, for every (wA,α) the aggregate
demand for labor, D, is anywhere between Ma(wA) to Mc(wC,α) since each
ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between employing children-only or adults-only. Thus what
we have is not a demand function, but a demand correspondence. Ignoring the
indivisibility of ﬁrms (assume M is large), we can write the aggregate demand
correspondence as:
D =[ Ma(wA),Mc(wC,α)]
The aggregate supply function of labor is given by:
S = Nl(wA,w C)
Given that demand is a correspondence and supply a function, how do we
deﬁne an equilibrium? Basically, an equilibrium is a conﬁguration of wages,
wA and wC, such that demand equals supply for both child labor and adult
labor. Since we know that adult labor supply is N, an equilibrium occurs if the
aggregate demand for child labor, given that a certain number of ﬁrms demand
adult labor equal to N, equals the aggregate supply of child labor.
Given wA,i fK is the number of ﬁrms that have to demand adult labor so
that the aggregate demand adds up to N,t h e ni tm u s tb et h a t :Ka(wA)=N.
Hence the number of ﬁrms demanding child labor will be M −
N
a(wA)
,a n dt h e







And since the supply of child labor is Nl(wA,w C) − N,w ec a nn o wd e ﬁne the
labor-market equilibrium formally.
Given α, the wages w∗
A and w∗
C,c o n s t i t u t ea nequilibrium if they satisfy











Now we are in a position to state the main result of the paper, the backlash
proposition, which says that an increased intensity of product boycott–that
is, a drop in α–can cause child labor to increase. As will be clear from the
proof of the theorem, this is not a stray special case, but happens over a class
of situations.
Theorem 1 There exist labor market equilibria such that if α declines, the
incidence of child labor increases.
9Proof. The proof will be given by constructing a class of examples where this
is always true.
Let us consider the case where the production function, F,i sa sf o l l o w s :
F(L)=
(
bL, for all L ≤ b L
b L, for all L>b L
Let b L be so large that it can be ignored for now. More precisely, suppose
b L>N. Let us also assume that:
s − mαγb < b < s (13)
It is easy to see that equilibrium adult wage will be such that:
w∗
A = b (14)
If wA <b ,t h e ne a c hﬁrm will demand b L, and since b L is very large, demand will
exceed supply. Meanwhile, if wA >b ,demand will be zero. Hence the demand
curve for labor is horizontal.
Since adults-only ﬁrms earn zero proﬁt, we know that in equilibrium the
children-only ﬁrms will earn zero, and thus:
w∗
C = αγb = αγw∗
A (15)
By (13) and (14), w∗
A <s . Therefore, in equilibrium children work. Also, by
(13), s − mw∗
C <w ∗














Let us now see what happens to labor supply if α drops. Adult labor supply
of a household is of course ﬁxed at 1. With adult wage at w∗











Hence, as α falls w∗
C falls, and child labor supply increases. Since the demand
curve is horizontal, a rise in child labor supply implies that the amount of child
labor increases.
Remark 1 The backlash result applies to a much larger class of situations than
the one described in the proof of the theorem. The general class may be described
as follows: Suppose we have a stable equilibrium in which wC > 0 and wA <s .
Then there exists  >0 satisfying the property that if α decreases by less than
 , the incidence of child labor increases.
Notice that in the example used in the proof, as α falls, adult wage is constant
and child wage falls. Hence, worker households suﬀer a welfare loss. In other
10words, an increased boycott could cause child worker households to be worse oﬀ
and cause the amount of child labor to rise.
Note that we can use Theorem 1 to comment on what happens if a product
boycott is started. This is because the start of a product boycott means a shift
in α f r o m1t ol e s s - t h a n - 1 . S oi ti sas p e c i a lc a s eo fl o w e r i n gα and therefore
comes under the purview of Theorem 1.
What is worrisome about this surprising result is that it occurs under normal
conditions and is not simply a non-generic, exotic result. In other words, it
warns us that when we sanction products in order to curb child labor, we may
end up having exactly the opposite eﬀect, rather like the rebound headaches
that some migraine suﬀerers get from pain-killers.
This is not to deny that there are contexts and levels of boycott intensity
that can curb child labor. The most obvious case is where α =0 .T h a t i s ,
the case in which consumers will not buy a tainted product unless the product
is completely free. If α =0 ,aﬁrm will not employ children if wC > 0. Thus
for ﬁrms to have any demand for child labor, wC has to be zero. But if wage
is zero, labor supply will be zero. So α =0would eliminate child labor.
But a total boycott, where no one buys any goods that have any child labor
input and a positive price, is quite extreme. Can child labor be eliminated





Any production function for which F0(0) >s , will have e α>0. Since F(b L) is
the largest possible output, and s>0, i tm u s tb et h a te α<1.
Our claim is that, if the intensity of product boycott is greater than that
represented by e α (i.e. if α<e α), then child labor will be eliminated. To prove
this, rewrite (16) as:
max
A





[e αF(γC) − 0 · C]
Hence for all wA <s ,
max
A
[F(A) − wAA] > max
C
[e αF(γC) − 0 · C] (17)
By (9) , (10), and (17), we know that, for all wA <s ,
φ(wA, e α) ≤ 0.
Next, note that α<α 0 implies φ(wA,α) <φ (wA,α 0). Hence what we have
proved is this: If wA <s ,and α<e α,t h e nwC ≡ φ(wA,α) ≤ 0.
Suppose now there is a boycott so strong that α<e α. If the equilibrium
adult wage, w∗
A,i sl e s st h a ns,t h e nw∗
C = φ(w∗
A,α) will be non-positive. Thus
child labor supply is zero, making the incidence of child labor zero. If, on the
11other hand, w∗
A ≥ s, child labor supply is again zero, and so the incidence of
child labor is zero. Therefore, α<e α is suﬃcient to eliminate child labor.
This does not mean that setting α so low that it eliminates child labor will
always be beneﬁcial for children. In fact, typically child welfare will decline
with such a boycott. The exception is if the model has multiple equilibria,
as in Basu and Van (1998). Then a strong boycott, like a legislative ban,
can deﬂect the economy from an equilibrium with a high incidence of child
labor to another pre-existing equilibrium with no child labor; as was shown in
Basu and Van (1998) (see, also, Emerson and Knabb, 2005), in that case, child
welfare rises as child labor is eliminated, and the boycott is worthwhile both
because it removes child labor and raises child welfare. There are also models
with imperfect capital markets where a ban on child labor results in a Pareto
improvement (e.g., Baland and Robinson, 2000).
4 Policy Implications and Empirical Extensions
What the above analysis has hopefully made clear is that the eﬀectiveness of
a product boycott in achieving the desired outcome is conditional. While the
intention of those partaking in the boycott is usually the reduction of child
labor, the consequence of their actions may, in a wide variety of cases, be the
opposite of that intended. The policy recommendation therefore depends on
t h ec a s ei nq u e s t i o n .
A case in which the above paradoxical outcome will occur is when the de-
mand curve for labor is fairly elastic. In fact, such an outcome is more likely
the ﬂatter the demand curve. The household supply of labor varies with wages
only when the adult wage does not reach subsistence and when there are mem-
bers of the household not at work. This portion of the supply curve is actually
downward sloping, as increasing the adult wage means the gap between it and
the critical minimal consumption level decreases, and fewer children need to be
sent to the workplace. Knowledge of the relative elasticities of demand and
the downward-sloping portion of supply are pivotal in determining whether a
product boycott will entail the intended result. If demand is ﬂatter than the
wage-variant portion of supply, a product boycott will likely cause an increase in
child labor. This implication is especially sobering for boycotts targeting goods
produced in small, open economies, as they are characterized by perfectly elastic
labor demand curves.
Empirical work corresponding to the theoretical analysis above is necessary
to address whether or not our main result is likely to hold in speciﬁcc a s e s . A
number of obstacles stand in the way of the researcher pursuing this path. The
greatest problem is ﬁnding good data on the incidence of child labor. Firms
using child labor have virtually no incentive to tell truthfully of it. Nevertheless,
there are various data sets available and a growing body of empirical literature
on the subject.
It is diﬃcult to ﬁnd direct evidence for whether our backlash result is likely
to hold in a particular situation. The main task of the empirical researcher
12has to be to ﬁnd circumstantial evidence. For this we will have to look for two
kinds of evidence. First, it will need to be checked if the supply curve of child
labor is downward-sloping. Second, we need to ﬁnd out if the demand for child
labor is very elastic. If both these conditions are valid, then an adverse reaction
to product boycott is very likely, and consumer product boycotts would be ill-
advised. On the supply of child labor, there is some evidence that children
work typically to stave oﬀ extreme poverty, and so a drop in child wage is likely
to increase the supply of child labor. Further and more direct evidence needs
to be collected on this, but the big need–and very little exists on this–is to
determine the nature of demand for child labor.
The theory also highlights some intermediate propositions that can be tested.
And if they test positive, it will increase conﬁdence in the overall plausibility of
the backlash theorem. The most interesting intermediate proposition is that a
heightened consumer boycott should drive child wage lower. This will not be
easy to test since we will want a situation where the heightened boycott is not
itself caused by worsening conditions in the child labor market. But this will
be well worth testing.
Economic theory can alert us to certain possibilities. It is now important
to do focussed empirical work to determine how likely these possibilities are in
speciﬁc situations and countries. But even before such empirical results are
available, this theoretical model should disabuse us of the widespread presump-
tion that consumer product boycotts curb child labor.
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